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
## 1. PRESIDENT DIEM'S BROTHER COMMENTS ON SEATO

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President Diem's brother and principal adviser, Ngo Dinh Nhu, believes the military value of SEATO is greatly overrated by British Commissioner

General for Southeast Asia Sir Robert Scott, who recently visited the Indochina states. Nhu thinks Scott's suggestion of the possible future adherence of Indonesia and Burma to SEATO is academic and observes that combining militarily weak states in Southeast Asia to the neutralist states would be adding "zero to zero."



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## Comment

President Diem has recently been showing interest in a more formal association with SEATO. However, his brother's opinions, which normally carry weight in the development of South Vietnamese policy, may cause Diem to temper his attitude toward the Manila pact organization.



2. INDIA UNLIKELY TO SUPPORT RESOLUTION CENSURING  
PATHET LAO

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
In a conversation with the Indian chairman of the International Control Commission in Laos, Ambassador Yost gained the impression that New Delhi is now chiefly concerned with preventing an intensification of hostilities in Laos and is most unlikely to join in any report condemning either party. The

chairman pointed out his government had failed to censure the Diem government for its failure to comply with the terms of the Geneva accords and is therefore now reluctant to denounce the Pathet Lao.

The Indian chairman in Phnom Penh, meanwhile, told Ambassador McClintock on 24 November he is convinced the Laotian problem is linked to that of Vietnam and that the probable indefinite partitioning of Vietnam would lead to a de facto partitioning of Laos.

Comment

Failure of the control commission to support the royal government's case against the Pathet Lao before the Geneva co-chairmen would probably serve further to persuade Laotian government leaders that a military offensive, despite insufficient logistic resources, is the only alternative to a partition of the country.



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#### 4. STATE OF EMERGENCY DECLARED ON CYPRUS

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The British declaration of a state of emergency on Cyprus on 26 November is partly a reaction to the mounting tide of violence and guerrilla attacks by Cypriot terrorists and is intended as a stern warning of Britain's determination to restore order in the colony. On 25 November the terrorist organization EOKA issued a call for "retribution in blood" and Cypriot Nationalist leader Archbishop Makarios indicated to the American consul in Nicosia

his belief that London would soon be forced to give Cyprus an unconditional guarantee of self-determination.

Makarios has already rejected London's latest--and not yet public--reiteration of its offer of "a large measure of" self-government, which for the first time included an offer to consider Cypriot self-determination at some unspecified future time. In denouncing the emergency declaration, which touched off a new wave of Nationalist violence, Makarios appears publicly to have aligned himself with the Nationalist extremists.

London, for prestige and strategic reasons, and because of strong reaction from Turkey, will probably refuse any further concession toward self-determination. Since Makarios probably could not accept the British plan in any case without forfeiting his leadership of the Cypriot cause, the prospect is for a period of violence bordering on guerrilla operations, with the possibility of incidents involving American personnel.

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**THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION**  
(Information as of 1700, 27 November)

Incidents continue to be reported on Israel's frontiers with Egypt and Jordan. The Israeli army's listing of incidents, including two casualties, suggests that it is continuing to prepare the record in anticipation of retaliatory action. [REDACTED]

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The Jordanians are taking additional steps to tighten border security between Jordan and Israel and to prevent Arab infiltrations into Israel. General Glubb, commander in chief of the Jordanian Arab Legion, believes Egyptians in Jordan are not only directing commando raids into Israel, but are also instilling such dissatisfaction with British leadership of the Arab Legion that it ultimately may have to be withdrawn. [REDACTED]

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Egyptian minister of war Amir, who is also commander in chief of the armed forces, is currently conducting military talks in Damascus, and has publicly proclaimed his objective as making "the Arab states one state and the Arab armies one army." In New York, the Egyptian deputy foreign minister said on 25 November that Egypt would accept outside mediation on the Palestine situation but would not agree to direct meetings between the Arab states and Israel. At the same time recent press reports have been indicating that Marshal Tito, who probably would welcome the opportunity, might act as a possible mediator in the dispute. Tito is expecting to start his visit to Egypt on 20 December. There is no indication he will stop in Israel. He told Secretary Dulles on 7 November, however, he would point out to Nasr and all the Arab states that they must recognize the fact that Israel has become a state. [REDACTED]

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
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
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Following up the recent French agreement to resume shipments of jet planes to Egypt, France has reportedly signed contracts to sell Mystere Mark II aircraft to Israel, according to a Paris press report of 26 November. However, the French counselor in Tel Aviv told an American embassy official on 23 November that Israel is no longer interested in obtaining Mark II Mysteres because there is doubt that these planes can compete with MIG-15's. Israel, he said, would like to get Mark IV Mysteres but the French government has thus far made no commitment to deliver Mark IV's. It is part of the French plan to balance arms shipments to Egypt by authorizing delivery of Mystere jets to Israel. Israel is most anxious to obtain F-86 jet aircraft from the US and from Canada. Israeli officials have suggested to the American air attaché in Tel Aviv that if the F-86's were delivered, Israel might drop efforts to procure Mysteres.



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